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Modes of Experience: Everyday 
Aesthetics Between Erlebnis, 
Erfahrung, and Lebenswelt
Gioia Laura Iannilli - Giovanni Matteucci
This paper focuses on the notion of experience, whose conceptual analysis seems to be often neglected 
or at least not sufficiently made explicit in the current discourse on Everyday Aesthetics. In our 
investigation this notion will be tackled, in particular, through the lens of such concepts as Erlebnis, 
Erfahrung, and Lebenswelt, which are drawn from the continental philosophical tradition. Purpose of the 
paper is to present a provisional framework aimed at clarifying that a more accurate conceptualization 
of experience allows for a better contemporary reflection on the aesthetics of everyday life. | Keywords: 
Aesthetic Experience, Erlebnis, Erfahrung, Lebenswelt, Everydayness
1. Experience as Everyday Aesthetics’ Underlying Core Concept 
As it developed over the last few decades, Everyday Aesthetics has established 
itself as a  sub-discipline that deals with phenomena that are also (if not, at 
least in some cases, somewhat exclusively) located outside the perimeter of 
a  culturally defined sphere such as that of the Fine Arts. In an attempt to 
delineate its own research scope, this sub-discipline has therefore been mainly 
concerned with understanding whether the boundaries of the aesthetic are or 
are not to be traced with respect to the art world. As is well known, the views 
that have emerged in this regard diverge. In order to bring these differences to 
the fore, these views have been categorized on the basis of various oppositional 
labels, such as, for instance, ‘weak-strong’ (Dowling 2010; Ratiu 2013; Forsey 
2014), ‘expansionist-restrictivist’ (Leddy 2015; Puolakka 2017), ‘continuist-
discontinuist’ (Matteucci 2016). Another way of describing these views has 
been provided by Shusterman (2012), by stressing a ‘transfiguration-
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ordinariness’ opposition originally meant to highlight a different conception of 
the aesthetic in general. A comparison between these dichotomic couples can 
be found in the overview offered by Iannilli (2018; 2019).
Rather than returning to the terms at issue in these disputes, here we would 
like to address a question that underlies them and yet, as such, seems to us to 
have usually been ignored. Whatever the answers or types of answers to the 
question about the relationship between everyday aestheticity and artistic 
aestheticity are, in our opinion the everyday aesthetician should first of all 
clarify what notion of experience he or she adopts in carrying out his or her 
analyses. Actually, while there has often been an interest in discussing what 
an aesthetic experience is, or how it is configured, there has unfortunately been 
a neglect in clarifying in what sense one can speak of an aesthetic experience, 
while naïvely assuming that the notion of ‘experience’ can be considered 
univocal and unambiguous and, hence, universally acceptable.
This neglect risks being a  reason for developing an unclear or flawed 
theoretical approach. This undoubtedly affects what has seemed so  far to be 
the main question of Everyday Aesthetics, which lies at the core of the 
abovementioned controversies on the specificity of the everyday (non-artistic) 
mode of the aesthetic. Much of what has been discussed in this regard might 
perhaps be part of an unintentional comparison between alternative models 
not of the aesthetic, but of experience. It is no coincidence that such debates 
do not seem to adequately emphasize the fact that Everyday Aesthetics implies 
a  mapping of experience as such and, consequently, a  particular 
conceptualization of it, even prior to a  determination of the aesthetic 
dimension. If the model of experience one wants to enforce in the description 
is not made clear, the risk is to be unable to compare the different strategies of 
articulation offered by Everyday Aesthetics. One question that needs to be 
asked, then, is whether there are conceptual models of experience that prove 
particularly fruitful for addressing the analysis of the aesthetic in its everyday 
mode, that is, beyond (or outside) the territory of the arts at least potentially.
We believe that one of the strengths of Everyday Aesthetics is having 
challenged the possibility to define the aesthetic starting from the 
identification of specific objects (just like artworks, in the case of the classical 
approach of aesthetics).  Instead of selecting a  circumscribed set of objects, 
Everyday Aesthetics invites us to see or consider the aesthetic in its 
concretization in practices, processes, actions, gestures, and behaviours. In our 
opinion, this means equating the aesthetic with an experiential dimension. 
Therefore, the question whether there are well-defined contents that belong to 
the proper domain of the aesthetic can be left aside at first. Instead, the 
question of what conception of experience might be able to accommodate this 
same dimension cannot be avoided, all the more so  because the experience 
at  issue here, in our specific framework, must be clearly compatible with the 
characterization of everydayness. It is not, therefore, a matter of an experience 
(or a  conception of it) established starting from the exceptionality or 
extraordinariness of some culturally defined contents, regardless of how much 
one might leave open the possibility that there is a  continuity between such 
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an  operative dimension in the everyday and some cultural manifestations that 
are strongly characterized in some sense. And even in the case in which it is 
believed that the aesthetic in the everyday possesses its own extraordinariness 
(which is uncertain anyway), it would still be necessary to justify this belief by 
starting from an everyday flow which, as such, is not exceptional or ordinary. 
The work we present here is a theoretical sketch, whose aim is to outline what 
is currently an ongoing research project. For this reason, we will simply 
proceed on the level of a  conceptual characterization, retrieving or drawing 
from the contributions of some of those who, in an exemplary way, have placed 
the notion of experience at the centre of their philosophical analysis. As 
a  sketched proposal, this work cannot but be programmatic. We will limit 
ourselves to provide general indications with generic references aimed 
at  establishing connections between continental philosophical traditions and 
Everyday Aesthetics.
2. Between Erlebnis and Erfarhung: Starting from Walter Benjamin and 
Georg Simmel
We have just said that the ordinariness of the aesthetic is what Everyday 
Aesthetics deems relevant. But what does it mean to speak of ‘non-exceptional’ 
or ‘ordinary’ experience in our historical context? Today, the conspicuous or 
even emphatic practices of production, promotion and consumption of ‘certain’ 
experiences, also thanks to the so-called new technologies, are indeed 
widespread, and precisely on an aesthetic basis. Let’s  just think of the 
countless phenomena of aestheticization of the everyday that populate our 
real and virtual environments today. Moreover, all this is clearly related to the 
fact that the sub-disciplinary path of Everyday Aesthetics began in the 1990s, 
namely the historical moment in which a  phenomenon such as 
aestheticization took off and spread widely. This connection between the 
flourishing of Everyday Aesthetics and the advent of aestheticization is not 
secondary at all (Matteucci, 2017). As a consequence, we can say that Everyday 
Aesthetics, and its inherent way of conceiving of experience, answers to 
processes of radical transformation of experiential regimes, also on the basis of 
technological advances.
From this point of view there are important analogies between our historical-
anthropological context and the context that fuelled the thought of Walter 
Benjamin, who tried to identify and interpret the violent impacts brought 
about by metropolitan reality and mass culture. Also for this reason 
Benjamin’s reflection on experience can serve as a trigger or starting point for 
our investigation. 
More specifically, it is useful to recall Benjamin’s  stance here because of the 
conceptual typology he proposes. In his essay On Some Motifs in Baudelaire 
(Benjamin, 1939), by exploiting a  terminological richness of the German 
language that has no counterpart in English, Benjamin distinguishes between 
experience as Erlebnis and experience as Erfahrung. These are two crucial terms 
in the history of philosophical thought (on this, with reference to Everyday 
Aesthetics, see also Ratiu (2017, pp. 40-43)). If Erfahrung generally amounts to 
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1 The Erlebnis/Erfahrung distinction on the basis of the identification of the difference between 
leben and fahren has also been explored, albeit within the framework and with the partiality of 
the hermeneutic-ontological tradition, by Amoroso (1988, pp. 13–45). This text also offers 
precious indications on the history of the concept of Erlebnis from its origin in the Goethezeit 
until its revival in Husserl, also in relation to the notion of Lebenswelt, which will be dealt 
with later in this paper.
what is defined as ‘experience’, Erlebnis has no corresponding unambiguous 
single term in English. It is usually translated as ‘lived experience’, as if it were 
a  specification of experience in general or as if it designated that particular 
portion of the experience that is, indeed, ‘lived’. To grasp the nuanced meaning 
implied by the two German terms, however, it is useful to take into 
consideration their respective etymologies.
Erfahrung comes from the verb erfahren and therefore from fahren, which 
means ‘to travel’; instead, Erlebnis comes from the verb erleben and therefore 
from leben, which means ‘to live’.1 In both cases there is the prefix ‘er-’, which 
makes the subsequent verb transitive. Consequently, in the first case, 
experience is understood as taking a  journey that makes what is encountered 
along the way become a content of the journey itself; it is as if along the way 
what is encountered turned from an obstacle into a ‘baggage’ that the traveller 
collects and carries with him or her in the continuation of the journey. 
An eminent philosophical example can help clarify what we mean.  Think, for 
instance, of that “Experience of Consciousness” (Erfahrung des Bewußtseins) 
whose “science” (Wissenschaft) Hegel outlines in his Phänomenologie des Geistes 
(1807). He describes it precisely as the integration in consciousness of the 
various “determined negations” that consciousness absorbs in itself in the 
course of the journey it makes to progressively rise as “Absolute Spirit”. Should 
the English grammar allow it, we would have to say that experiencing 
as erfahren means ‘to travel something’. 
With Erlebnis, on the other hand, experience is understood as ‘to live 
something’, just as one experiences a  circumstance (i.e., being abroad) 
savouring, so to speak, a certain situation (i.e., being on vacation) and so forth. 
The function of the prefix ‘er-’, in this case, is to present life as a  relational 
operativity, and not as a  mere indistinct flow. If the Leben selbst is the 
relentless flow of life, the Erleben is the process of moving about in a  vital 
relationship until assuming a (also reflective) stance within it.
In order to fully grasp the conceptual polarity in question, one should not 
consider Erlebnis as a subset of Erfahrung in general. Instead, one should make 
a  distinction between ‘experience as a  journey’ (Erfahrung) on the one hand, 
and ‘experience as life’ (Erlebnis) on the other. There would then be a  further 
complication to be taken into account, due to the fact that while the ending ‘-
ung’ of the term Erfahrung indicates the taking place of an action, the ending ‘-
nis’ of the term Erlebnis indicates the abstract property that is realized 
in  an  action. But for our purposes this further complication can be neglected 
here. 
Starting from this terminological-conceptual distinction, Benjamin defines two 
experiential regimes that are tendentially opposed. In particular, he pays 
attention to the experiences of shock that are ‘lived’ (precisely!) in 
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the  metropolises, namely the scenario for Baudelaire’s poetry. Such Erlebnisse 
are linked to sensationalism, to what is emphatic, to what is even more liable 
to manipulation and commodification. Now, in his view, such a  way of living 
contrasts with the integration in which experience is accomplished as 
a journey, namely Erfahrung, in the sense that it narrows its space or scope. The 
more one is engaged in living the environment, in dealing with its stimuli and 
shocks, the more one reduces the ability to sediment, to let ‘settle’ the contents 
of his/her own interaction with the environment. This way of experiencing fails 
in making that interaction an integrated baggage of experience, and thus 
in fully actualizing its expressive potential.
It is not hard to see that in this contraposition, the pole of Erfahrung has 
a  priority, or at least a  more positive connotation. This latter seems to bring 
with it a characterization of experience in a fuller sense. Consequently, we will 
have to say that whatever has the character of shock, of trauma, and is 
encountered in an environment saturated with stimuli, which is embodied 
in  Benjamin’s  time by the metropolis (particularly, in Baudelaire’s  case, by 
Paris), denies experience in the proper sense. Thus, if experience in general and 
without characterizations is Erfahrung, Erlebnis becomes the way to express 
a lesser form of it, in terms of something that tends to impoverish it.
Benjamin is not entirely unprecedented in this analysis. His diagnosis 
concerning the characterization of life in the metropolis echoes a  theme that 
was already addressed by Georg Simmel. In his celebrated essay The Metropolis 
and Mental Life (1903), Simmel similarly contrasts metropolitan and non-
metropolitan life. In fact, we could even say that Benjamin focused on and 
clarified the technical terms which he found useful for retrieving a Simmelian 
antinomic relationship. In fact, Simmel grasps this tension when describing 
the relationship between the shock of metropolitan frenzy and the progressive 
sedimentation of the slow, cyclical temporality of non-metropolitan life. 
Suffice it to consider that experience as Erfahrung is described by Benjamin in 
a  way that recalls the characteristics of non-metropolitan life highlighted by 
Simmel, namely in relation to the cyclical and ritual recurrence of civil and 
religious festivities that make a  community cohesive. It is in such situations 
that experiences resonate in the current moment as endowed with 
meaningfulness, while integrating tradition and expectation, past and future. 
Hence, experience as Erfahrung is charged with the potential of auraticity, 
while Erlebnis is a  contraction in the moment involving the negation and 
disappearance of any echo of an aura. 
Thus, to go back to another of Benjamin’s  all-too-famous theses, the 
experience of Erfahrung seems to take place in relation to that same aesthetic 
dimension of the aura that was in force before the age of mechanical and 
technical reproducibility of art.  An auratic art that would be the ‘object’ of 
an Erfahren would now be replaced by an art that is no longer auratic, but the 
object of a  mere Erleben. The antinomic matrix introduced by Simmel in his 
analysis of the two experiential regimes, would thus seem to be not only 
resumed, but even radicalized in Benjamin’s analysis.
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2 Benjamin (1939, p. 282) recalls how “around 1840 it was briefly fashionable to take a turtle for 
a walk in the arcades” by the first flâneurs.
Indeed, with his own analysis Benjamin also underlines how an incessant, 
everyday, ordinary increase in shock produces a growing numbing of the ability 
to relate with the environment that results in a  true anaesthesia. Busy with 
parrying the blows that come from the hectic environment in which it is 
immersed, the consciousness would not have the necessary energy to dwell in 
the expressive relationship with the context and therefore to integrate its 
potential into its baggage. What fails in the regime of Erlebnis would be, in 
other words, the aesthetic ability to relate with the environment that, instead, 
is reflected in the sense of aura that surrounds the experiential regime of 
Erfahrung. The loss of experience-Erfahrung, thus, would also mean a  loss of 
aestheticity. 
In this regard too, Benjamin’s debt to Simmel cannot be ignored. The analysis 
of the metropolitan viveur offered by Benjamin seems to recall, in fact, that of 
the attitude of the blasé developed by Simmel. Both are so  immersed in the 
sensationalistic spectacles of the metropolis that they are no longer impressed 
by anything. Their gaze shows the same detached indifference that is obtained 
through habituation. Therefore, it is quite telling that Benjamin’s metropolitan 
viveur is embodied by a borderline case of a traveller (i.e., a potential subject of 
Er-fahrung), namely, the flâneur who strolls in slow motion at the pace of the 
turtles he walks on a leash.2 According to this diagnosis, the regime of Erlebnis 
contracts the journey to the point of shattering it into atomic, crystallized, 
repetitive instants. Experience is no longer articulated, is no longer Erfahrung, 
and loses the potential connection with an aura. 
On a  closer look, this has several interesting implications in relation to the 
topic of everydayness, and therefore for the framework of an Everyday 
Aesthetics. As an Erlebnis, experience becomes an-aesthetic precisely in 
becoming everyday, in becoming no longer extraordinary and incapable of 
dynamism. In other terms, Erlebnis denotes an experience that is of 
an  everyday kind precisely to the extent that it is no longer sensitively 
pregnant or expressive – like the haughty eyes of the blasé, which never return 
a meaningful correspondence to those who meet them. Therefore, according to 
this typological thesis that Simmel lays out as an antinomy and Benjamin 
dialectically retrieves, the increase in shock, or the increase in shocking 
interactions would be a sign of the loss of both aestheticity and experientiality 
in the proper sense (here the close nexus between these two elements is indeed 
to be stressed). Precisely to the extent that all this becomes everyday and 
familiar, experience would result in a loss of aestheticity.
3. Beyond Benjamin’s Typology
All this constitutes a  significant conceptual problem for the everyday 
aesthetician. Indeed, if the everydayness of Erlebnis amounts to a  dissolution 
of aestheticity, the very notion of Everyday Aesthetics turns out to be 
inconsistent or oxymoronic. The apparent corollary of Benjamin’s  analysis is 
that when we speak of aesthetics in an everyday mode we are at best speaking 
of something that is inherently deficient from an experiential point of view. 
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3 This seems to be the direction taken by Leddy (2012), who provides a phenomenological 
interpretation of Benjamin’s notion of aura in order to qualify the everyday as aesthetic. 
Investigating this, however, would deserve an attention that we cannot provide here for 
the sake of the discussion.  
Insofar as Erlebnis is the effect of a mere stimulus, a  reaction to a  shock, our 
lived everyday experience would be reduced to a  clash with the surrounding 
reality. Hence, our everyday would not generate anything that could be 
considered authentically experiential in a properly aesthetic sense. So the loss 
of the aura that resonates in Benjamin’s concept of Erfahrung is tout court the 
collapse of the aesthetic into an empty lived everydayness. As a consequence, 
from the point of view of an enquiry into the question of experience, the label 
‘Everyday Aesthetics’ risks losing any meaning.
This apparent puzzle, however, is not surprising. In fact, defining everyday 
(aesthetic) experience is far from being a  simple task. That’s  why, insofar as 
Erlebnis is concerned, in order to avoid the risk of lapsing into forms of 
mechanical reductionism, it is necessary to begin from a sufficiently dynamic 
and processual vision of experience in general. And it would certainly not help 
to widen the notion of experience as auratic Erfahrung to the point of including 
extraordinary everyday scenarios.3 This could lead to a sort of aestheticism of 
the everyday that sublimates this latter into the artistic to endow it with some 
sort of aesthetic connotation. Actually, it should be pointed out that this is the 
path already taken by Benjamin, who in the essay on Baudelaire refers to the 
involuntary memory described by Proust in order to show a rare, ‘happy’ case 
in which an Erlebnis turns into Erfahrung. So  much so  that it eventually 
deserves the prestige of a  refined literary narration; indeed, a  way of 
transforming the everyday into an artwork.
It is therefore no coincidence that in Everyday Aesthetics the notion of 
everyday life tends to lean towards one of the two extremes of habitual and 
almost mechanical triviality, on the one hand, or of the extraordinary, an 
almost artistic event, on the other. In this regard, a rather balanced view is that 
offered by Ossi Naukkarinen (2013), who, in response to Melchionne (2013), 
defines in a  precise manner what it means to be ‘everyday’ and ‘aesthetic’ 
exactly by deepening the dynamic and processual character of the experience 
as such, with its various gradations of intensity. As Naukkarinen has observed, 
when one enters the exceptional and the extraordinary, a  character of shock 
emerges, which resembles the Erlebnis that is criticized by Benjamin as 
something not properly experiential and aesthetic. At the very least, according 
to Naukkarinen, that level should not be attained as a steady condition, as this 
would be devastating or destabilizing. It is true that one can reach that level in 
the processuality that constitutes the everyday. In fact, though, when it 
prevails, one exits the everyday as such. In such instances, the aesthetic that is 
encountered in an everyday setting configures another type of interaction.
Yet everyday experience is still to be meant as life, since the everyday 
surroundings are precisely ‘lived’. But this is a form of Erlebnis that is defined 
according to a  very different meaning from the one against which Benjamin 
polemicizes. In this regard, it may be useful to recall a  different usage of the 
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4 A similar move is proposed by an anthropologist like Victor Turner (1985 and 1986).
5 For the sake of conciseness see Matteucci (2004, pp. 59-82); see also the aesthetic writings 
collected in English in Dilthey (1989) and the seminal interpretation provided by Makkreel 
(1992).
concept of Erlebnis that can be traced back to Wilhelm Dilthey,4 a philosopher 
who is regarded as one of the first and main theorists of experience as Erlebnis. 
In Dilthey many of the characteristics attributed by Benjamin exclusively to 
Erfahrung constitute salient aspects of Erlebnis as such, starting from its 
irreducibility to an instantaneous and punctiform event and also from its 
configurative nature.5 It is not pointless to note, then, that with his argument 
against Erlebnis, which results in dissociating experience as life from the 
aesthetic, Benjamin is targeting only a reductive conception of this notion: the 
one that flourished in Germany in the generations following Dilthey.
On this basis, we could say that, in order to develop an Everyday Aesthetics, it 
is not enough to use a  grid that opposes Erlebnis and Erfahrung as merely 
antinomic experiential modalities (as happens in Simmel) or, at most, 
as dialectical in an art-centric sense (i.e., such that they can be condensed or 
synthetized, but only in highly artistic works, as happens for Benjamin with 
Proust’s narrations or with Baudelaire’s poems). Taking up a less narrow notion 
of Erlebnis, such as that offered by the line of thought that starts with Dilthey, 
might help here. One can therefore move away from a view of experience that 
is centered on the stimulus-response mechanism. Instead, one can start from 
the emphasization of the performative and expressive component of 
experiencing. In this way, experience as (everyday) life does not appear 
as  devoid of components of accumulation, sedimentation and stratification, 
which indeed constitute the aesthetic surroundings of true familiarity. 
Familiarity emerges to the extent that there is a  continuous texture we are 
enveloped in, yet not in a  single point in time nor on the basis of a dualistic 
relationship between subject and object. The very sense of familiarity implies 
a relational field. Not by chance the word familiarity refers to a dense context 
such as the network of ‘relatives’, of people one is inherently but multifariously 
related to. So  much so  that if we ought to become familiar with 
an  environment that is extraneous to us, we generally build a  series of 
practices that serve as a cocoon-ish dimension within which we move at ease, 
notwithstanding the individual atomic contents that we encounter in the wider 
space in which we live. This is an operative mode that remains stable also while 
the contents on which it is exercised vary, at least within certain limits. We 
recognize operatively – that is, through use, practice, and behaviours – our 
points of orientation and reference with respect to the environment around us; 
way before any conceptual determination (i.e., thematically). The environment 
possesses a  familiar physiognomy, like a  face that we know and whose 
individual features we may not be able to recognize, although it conveys a halo 
(an aura) of familiarity. In this sense, the experience that seems to be best 
suited to Everyday Aesthetics, though meant certainly ‘as life’, cannot be that 
of shock. It is a sort of Erlebnis-Erfahrung at once. So a structural limit of the 
typology proposed by Benjamin emerges.
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The everyday is, therefore, already ‘experience’ as a dialectical nexus between 
Erlebnis and Erfahrung in the sense in which these notions are defined by 
Benjamin. As mentioned, the possibility of such a  dialectical synthesis was 
apparent to Benjamin himself, in that he ascribes poetic excellence to 
Baudelaire (who also investigated such everyday aesthetic phenomena 
as  fashion) precisely for having expressed the connection between these two 
poles. That is why we have claimed that Benjamin presents a  dialectical 
conception of experience considered in the entire Erfahrung-Erlebnis arc. And 
yet, he attributes this synthetic capacity exclusively to art 
(i.e., Baudelaire’s poetry). On the one hand, this solution overcomes the merely 
antinomic contrast that can still be found in Simmel. On the other hand, 
however, it is flawed in conceiving this dialectical-aesthetic articulation of 
experience as possible only at the level of artistic expression, de facto 
overshadowing the level of everydayness.
4. A Little Help from John Dewey
The retrieval of this aesthetic-dialectical characterization of experience within 
the everyday comes into play through a perspective which is very well-known 
to everyday aestheticians, and which emerged in a  milieu similar to that of 
Simmel and Benjamin: John Dewey’s. A  contemporary of Simmel (Dewey was 
born in 1859 and Simmel in 1858) and active during Benjamin’s  time (Art 
as  Experience was published in 1934), Dewey in turn witnessed the 
transformations that followed the development of the metropolis and the 
opposition between experiential regimes.
The kind of experience described above is in fact what Dewey (1934) has in 
mind when he speaks of having “an experience”. Indeed, having an experience 
does not equate with the Erlebnis of a  shock that hits and does not develop 
as such. It is an experiential articulation shaped on the basis of the repetitive 
rhythm of natural cycles, such as the seasons of the year, but also such 
as  certain festive occasions that for Benjamin embody the potentially auratic 
meaningfulness of Erfahrung. Thus, the Deweyan conception of experience 
stands in some ways on the threshold between Erlebnis and Erfahrung in the 
sense we have seen before. It is as if Dewey thematized an experiential field in 
which two modalities usually thought of as primarily separated or opposed are 
instead understood as primarily co-operative polarities of a single dense field 
in which they are therefore integrated. 
This integration does not happen only on the emphatic level of artistic 
configuration, but already in the operative texture of everydayness. In this 
sense, the relationship between Erlebnis and Erfahrung in Deweyan terms is 
an integrated, polar, continuistic one. This is why the conception of experience 
offered by Dewey is both a  strongly unified conception and is also capable of 
doing justice to the aesthetic dimension of the everyday as such. Above all it 
does not presume artistic paradigms, despite various misunderstandings of 
this stance. In this, it is similar to Dilthey’s conception of Erlebnis as relational 
rather than as punctiform. Both Dewey and Dilthey speak of an experiencing 
that emerges according to the rhythm of life (anything but an indistinct flow), 
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based on a  significance (or Bedeutsamkeit) that is immanent and intrinsically 
extra-propositional. And they both connect this significance precisely to the 
aesthetic, in a very close nexus between sensing and expressing that art ‘only’ 
intensifies. While this significance immanent to the experiential field 
as  a  correspondence between organism and environment expresses itself, it 
also confers a  sense of familiarity, or inherence to us, on what appears to be 
an  aesthetic phenomenon, thereby giving qualitative importance to 
an experience in the flow of experience. The all-too-famous meal in Paris that 
Dewey brings as an example counts as an experience not because of its 
punctiform extraordinariness. The kernel of the question is that its qualitative 
intensity, which binds together what happened during the meal, is integrated 
into an individual’s  life insofar as it will work as an immanent source of 
salience for this individual to appreciate the significance of the meals he or she 
will later have. It will become more than a  term of similitude. It expresses in 
itself the multi-aspectual sense that the whole series of events we might label 
‘Having a Meal’ can take on for an individual, by embodying not only what it 
means to share a meal in good company in a certain environment, but also how 
a meal can mark a turning point for a person’s  life, the matrix of experiences 
with qualitative intensity that are variously constituted, the sense of knowing 
‘how to be in a situation’ that will act as an operative competence at hand, and 
so forth. 
Our proposal, then, is to consider the experientiality promoted by Dewey as 
an amendment of antinomic or dialectical views that are not entirely integrative 
and that tend to oppose modalities such as Benjamin’s  Erlebnis and Erfahrung 
(and it would be interesting to ascertain to what extent this amendment is 
accidental and to what extent intentional). Our thesis is that on the basis of this 
integrative model of experientiality we can construct aesthetic practices that are 
valuable not only to the individual who experiences them in a  merely lived 
moment, but also because they nest and accumulate potentials for meaning that 
are experienced as familiarity. They can thus become devices also for an 
intersubjective ecological niche by virtue of the meaningfulness they 
aesthetically make viable and available. The everyday, caught in this dynamic, 
expresses an aesthetic familiarity that is not reduced to the present since it 
interpolates the past, the present and the future, the here and the elsewhere, as 
Baudelaire’s poem À une passante analyzed by Benjamin shows in literary terms.
5. The Expressive Import of Familiarity: Experience and Lebenswelt
One of the problematic issues this essay aims at delving into can be summarized 
by the following question: what kind of everyday, or: familiar and non-
‘exceptional’, experience can Everyday Aesthetics be concerned with, particularly 
in the context of these first decades of the 21st century in which radical processes 
of aestheticization of experience are widespread? We shall see now that there is 
a  further notion that Everyday Aesthetics might consider in order to become 
more aware of the implied conception of experience it actually advocates. This is 
another notion that could be clarified by comparing Everyday Aesthetics as such 
with an apparently extraneous philosophical tradition.
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Everydayness and familiarity do not constitute a monolithic dimension, as we 
have tried to show. They imply a  plethora of aspects dynamically and 
processually related to each other that are not reducible exclusively to our 
interactions with and within urban or even metropolitan reality tout court. This 
premise is useful to clarify how our reference to the contributions by Simmel, 
Benjamin and Dewey in particular is exemplary with respect to the problem of 
the constitution of familiarity in a context in which the individual and society 
undergo various stimuli (stimuli that, as we have seen, also exceed the set of 
those ascribable to the art world). This is because this experience, in some 
ways, must be very similar to what must have been the experience of the 
metropolis carried out by the individual at the end of the 19th and at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Another way to clarify this point is to note how 
what can be described as the ‘metropolitan’ character of everyday experience is 
today experienced online, for example, or digitally. This is an increasingly 
pervasive environment that may not engage us physically. It does in fact 
‘furnish’ our everyday lives and, in particular since the last two years, it has 
begun to shape in an unprecedented and meaningful way our idea and practice 
of familiarity.
In any case, the type of experientiality that is most useful to illustrate this 
context consists in what emerged in the previous sections: an amendment, in 
a  strongly continuistic and processual Deweyan sense, of the relationship 
between Erlebnis and Erfahrung understood either antinomically or dialectically. 
This is apparent in the fundamentally relational conception presented in 
Naukkarinen (2013), albeit without the aim of programmatically bringing to the 
fore the philosophical references involved in the discourse. Given the purpose 
of our essay, however, it seems worthwhile to carry out a further exploration of 
the references underlying the conception of everyday experience sub specie 
aesthetica promoted by a contemporary Everyday Aesthetics. 
The amendment of the described modes of experience in a  Deweyan sense 
implies the idea of an almost tacit, operative sedimentation, a  subsistence of 
experience in a  state of potential meaningfulness, that can acquire the 
connotation of particularity and perspicuity and that can therefore also, yet not 
necessarily, be thematized. At a closer look, this conception is not far from that 
which connotes another fundamental concept coined within the continental 
philosophical tradition: that of Lebenswelt understood as a ‘fabric’ of continuity 
of practices with a  strong intersubjective connotation. The in-depth study of 
this aspect through key points will allow us ultimately, in this concluding 
section, to further clarify what we mean by ‘the expressive import of 
familiarity’.
Synthetically, the concept of Lebenswelt as it was first thematized in 
Husserl’s  late philosophy (see especially Husserl (1936)) has to do  with the 
plane of knowledge. The peculiarity of this concept lies in being perceived 
as ‘natural’, ‘given’, and at the same time being constituted, namely historical. 
In Husserl’s  reflection, it concerns the set of sedimented pre-Galilean 
knowledge that is disrupted by the arrival of Galileo and modern science. 
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On the other hand, by developing the discourse sub specie aesthetica, the plane 
on which we move properly concerns the constitution of Lebenswelt on 
a  different basis. In this context, in particular, we would like to dwell on the 
plane of expressivity. Clearly, we do not mean to claim that the question can be 
wholly resolved on such a  plane. Yet, we believe that it can exemplify in 
a  particularly fruitful way the connotation of meaningfulness that, previously, 
we have already ascribed to what has been called a nexus between sensing and 
expressing as distinctive of the aesthetic. 
We refer to Lebenswelt when we speak of a pervasive, operative, even implicit 
fabric or set of practices, ideas, values, etc., that we share to a greater or lesser 
extent with other conspecifics with whom we happen to live together in 
different contexts. As such, Lebenswelt would seem to coincide with 
a  dimension of familiarity, of everydayness. But is it really so? Our thesis is 
that between everydayness and the lebensweltich dimension of experience there 
is a relationship of dynamic continuity and reciprocity, which therefore cannot 
be thought of as an identity relationship. Everydayness is a  peculiar 
configuration of aspects of a  background that is not properly of an everyday 
kind precisely because it is lebensweltlich. This configuration is peculiar 
because it is not always conscious, and above all not always carried out on 
a  propositional level. It is a  way of making those background aspects 
perspicuous and salient, of making them more explicit, of bringing them from 
the background to the foreground. Exactly this transition is described by the 
integration between Erlebnis and Erfahrung according to the conception of 
experience we outlined before.
Has Everyday Aesthetics ever been aware of these layers? Only partially.
Fruitful indications about this issue can be found in the relatively recent 
literature that has appeared in this field. Although different labels are 
sometimes used, it seems to us that the distinctions that are made there are 
consistent with those we advocate. In this key, it is interesting to mention 
some attempts to distinguish and link different but related levels in which 
everyday experience would take place. 
First of all we can mention Haapala (2017), in partial continuity with Haapala 
(2005), where a  distinction is proposed between a ‘lived world’, or individual 
level of experience, and a  ‘life world’, or collective, cultural, social level of 
experience. The two levels are intertwined into a circular relationship based on 
the temporal aspect of experience. Then we can recall Naukkarinen and 
Vasquez (2017), in which a distinction is made between a ‘daily life’ experience 
and an ‘everyday’ experience. The former is understood as a  non-thematized 
background imbued with routines, while the latter is seen as the emergence, 
from the almost imperceptible flow of routine, of a  particular type of pattern 
that corresponds to the everyday, which the authors see as a  stance we take 
towards our daily life. We can then recall Ratiu (2017) resorting to 
a Gadamerian (see Gadamer (1960)) phenomenological-hermeneutical reading 
of the notions of Erlebnis as a  lived and immediate experience in which 
consciousness is intentionally directed to phenomena, and of Erfahrung as 
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an  experience derived from an interpretive activity that occurs temporally. 
Both of them would equally be part of the Lebenswelt of which also Ratiu 
emphasizes therefore both the individual and cultural-intersubjective 
dimension. 
Three more examples are in line with this path. Formis (2010) discerns what 
she defines as the ordinaire (the ordinary) from the quotidien (the everyday). 
On  the one hand, ordinaire would be a  more general, even transcendental, 
collective and potential mode of living. On the other hand, quotidien would be 
a  dimension with a  specific and actual spatiality and temporality which 
includes the various, single applications of this general mode. In other terms, 
the ordinary would be an invariable, universal dimension of experience, while 
the everyday would be the form, or the set of forms, it can take on, variably. 
Matteucci (2019) focuses on the relationship between an “aspectual complex” 
and a  niche. He holds that our everyday is what stems out of our encounter 
with such a  complex: it is a  scenario as a  pars pro toto of a “niche” that we 
inhabit. Finally Iannilli (2020) addresses the relationship between backgrounds 
and foregrounds. She holds that our everyday, our familiarity, consists in 
a  “fully rounded out” area of experience that emerges from something that 
(following the corresponding mathematical concept) she labels 
“neighborhoods”. In the first case, “fully rounded out” would be a  rather 
(i.e.,  contingently, dynamically, processually, non-essentially) stable, focused, 
saturated, foreground that we deem our own, personal, familiar. In the second 
case, “neighborhood” would be a  proximal surrounding in which we are 
immersed, an environment, a milieu, a background that we share with others. 
Going back to our issue, we can say that in all these cases everydayness, or 
familiarity, is meant as a  way of expressing Lebenswelt in a  specific present 
context. It should be noted that when we say ‘expressing’ we also imply a shift 
from a density (the dense texture of the Lebenswelt in which we are immersed) 
to a  discreteness (the recognizability of the familiar, everyday space, that we 
experience as our own), in which very particular structured forms emerge. 
Lebenswelt, in other words, is denser and finds specific emergencies and 
expressions in everyday familiarity. Here, namely between the two layers, there 
is an expressive nexus. 
The distinction at issue concerns, on the one hand, operating in an automatic 
way when one is immersed in environments that are taken for granted in their 
functioning, and, on the other hand, sensing that some aspects of this fabric 
actually possess some kind of ‘viscosity’ that is not reducible to cognitive 
recognition, but as such are savored as one’s own and therefore as familiar and 
everyday. An example may help to understand the point. Belonging to 
Lebenswelt is the set of practices that are carried out when one enters a coffee 
shop in general by performing a  series of gestures that are perceived 
as  ‘normal’: one approaches a  counter, orders a  coffee, buys it, waits for the 
order to be completed, drinks it and leaves. All these gestures imply the 
acquisition of a  competence on how to activate as effective devices the 
elements that ‘furnish’ the surrounding space according to their operative 
expressiveness (‘operative’ in the sense of the German fungierend, which is 
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6 This qualification is used “intransitively”, as in those enunciations like “this soap has 
a peculiar smell”, which Wittgenstein deals with for instance in Wittgenstein (1958, p. 158).
proper to the phenomenological lexicon). One will be rude or well-mannered, 
but also evidently local or foreigner, depending on the degree to which this 
competence is shared. One thus remains within the perimeter of the 
impersonality of the Lebenswelt. Moreover, though, when all of this acquires 
the hue of familiarity, these same gestures, far from losing their automatism 
feature, are in fact charged with a peculiar6 expressive value. It is that counter 
that is approached, that ‘usual’ coffee that is ordered, that familiar face to 
whom one smiles that is serving us, that way home that we take as we leave the 
place, etc. In the familiar surroundings, thus articulated, the traits of 
a  Lebenswelt become aspects that can be quasi-formalized in a  precise 
surrounding that is traced by the everydayness of those who inhabit it by virtue 
of its expressive import. It is as if we crossed the threshold that leads from 
impersonality to a  personal domain that is not necessarily, entirely and 
immediately private.
This, indeed, does not mean that Lebenswelt needs familiarity to become 
expressive. Lebenswelt is a  network of expressive correspondences between 
organisms and environment on a perceptual basis. Let’s  just think of the role 
played by affordances in the creation of the networks of automatisms that are 
implemented in our social reality.  The question is thus of a different kind. On 
this same non-cognitive but aesthetic basis, Lebenswelt can find a more explicit 
manifestation and expression in the experiential nuclei of familiarity and 
everydayness precisely when these are actually practiced by this organism in 
this environment in a  certain way, or according to a  certain style. Then the 
more implicit Lebenswelt becomes that everydayness, that familiarity. Indeed, 
the same Lebenswelt can become many different everydaynesses, many 
different familiarities, depending on the moment and context. It is as if, in the 
shift from Lebenswelt to familiarity or everydayness, the impersonal and purely 
operative content of the former is reduced through experiential forms that 
tend to take on a  more clear-cut configuration that traces specific familiar 
surroundings.
This passage leads us to a  further feature of the relationship between 
Lebenswelt and everydayness. In both cases, a  principle of stability, of 
sedimentation, is in force, despite the fact that, at the same time, a  dynamic 
continuity and mutual transformation processes are also in force. If what has 
been said so far is true, Lebenswelt is dynamic and fluid in a higher degree than 
familiarity, or everydayness. The latter requires de facto a  greater level of 
qualitative stability, otherwise it would not be felt as familiar, everyday. To go 
back to our example of the coffee shop, what is at stake is not experiencing 
with ‘a’ counter but with ‘that’ counter. This, as already mentioned, obviously 
does not prevent us from becoming familiar with ‘things’ other than our own 
nucleus of familiarity and everydayness by virtue of our Lebenswelt. But this 
eventually produces a  process of modification of what we experience 
as  familiar and everyday. In other words, Lebenswelt and familiarity are both 
dynamic but at different rates, so to speak, or with different degrees.
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Sedimentation and transformation, operativity and expressiveness, potential 
making sense and actual practice of making sense are clearly the cornerstones 
of this relationship. And in our opinion, they further corroborate the thesis 
that has been argued so  far, according to which what is proper to 
(a contemporary) Everyday Aesthetics is an integrative mode of experience that 
has these very characteristics. Namely, Everyday Aesthetics should not reduce 
its discourse or even itself to the extremes of ‘pure’ and ‘uncontaminated’ low-
key ordinariness on the one hand, or the aesthetically validating, striking 
exceptionality on the other. In this sense, thanks to the mediation of 
Lebenswelt in its aesthetic acceptation, it would overcome the opposition 
between two conceptions that are both reductive as far as experience-Erlebnis 
and experience-Erfahrung are concerned.
6. Conclusion
The path we attempted to trace ends here. It was meant to show how Everyday 
Aesthetics could (or perhaps should) reconsider today important references 
that have generally been kept outside of its own focus due to the temporal and 
geographical origins of the sub-discipline. As a  matter of fact, although the 
historical origins of Everyday Aesthetics are well delimited temporally (the 
1990s or so) and geographically (the United States and Northern Europe, in 
particular Finland), its roots seem to lie in a  context that is geographically 
broader and historically deeper. This reconsideration can happen once the 
problem of experience is grasped in its centrality for establishing a  research 
program that addresses the aesthetic dimension of everyday life in 
a theoretically aware manner. 
The integrative nexus of the Erlebnis-Erfahrung polarity brings together 
references such as Simmel and Benjamin (as well as Dilthey). Moreover, 
through the retrieval of the notion of Lebenswelt, it leads to a reconsideration 
of the phenomenological matrix of Everyday Aesthetics while showing 
a fruitful convergence with its more usual pragmatist matrix. We believe that, 
in order to help Everyday Aesthetics fully take root in the context of the 
European continental tradition, these passages concerning the notion of 
experience can play a  role that is by no means secondary. Namely, they can 
help specify those modes of the aesthetic that today dominate our 
technologically infrastructured ecological niche, which makes the Everyday 
Aesthetics’ program even more urgent.
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